We consider the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication in which a user wishes to compute the product of two matrices with the assistance of honest but curious servers.
I. INTRODUCTION
A user has two matrices, A ∈ F r×s q and B ∈ F s×t q , and is interested in obtaining AB ∈ F r×t q with the help of N servers without leaking any information about A or B to any server. We assume that all servers are honest and responsive, but that they are curious, in that any T of them may collude to try to deduce information about either A or B.
This setting, known as secure distributed matrix multiplication, was investigated in [1] - [5] , where the main performance metric considered was the download cost, i.e. the total amount of data downloaded by the user from the servers.
In this paper we show that if we only consider the download cost then secure matrix multiplication can be converted into a simple private information retrieval problem. We call the conversion procedure, private oracle querying. This comes at a huge upload cost, however, since it involves the user uploading to each server a vector of exponential size.
The upload cost is often ignored in the private information retrieval literature because for large files the total communication cost is dominated by the download cost. This, however, is not true for the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem giving no reason to disconsider the total communication cost.
Another issue with the secure distributed matrix multiplication setting was raised in [6] : If the user already has the matrices A and B, why not do the computation locally and This work was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF 1817635 and CNS 1801630. avoid all communication entirely? Indeed, without any extra conditions on the model, calculating AB locally is both secure and minimizes the download cost.
We believe the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem has an underlying assumption which hasn't been made too explicit before. The main reason for distributing a matrix multiplication, where the user has both matrices, is to speed up computations. Thus, the computational time complexity of the scheme must not be ignored.
Therefore, we propose that for the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem where the user has both matrices, the performance metric must take both total communication cost and time complexity into account.
A. Main Contributions
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• We show that the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem can be transformed into a private information retrieval problem, which in turn improves on previous schemes for secure distributed matrix multiplication if the performance metric of interest is solely the download cost. This transformation is done by what we call private oracle querying. • Private oracle querying comes at great upload costs for the user and computational costs for both the user and the servers. Indeed, in the setting where the user has both matrices, private oracle querying takes longer than performing matrix multiplication locally. However, in other variations of the setting, where the user may not have access to both matrices or computational costs are not important, like in [7] and [6] , the proposed scheme can be readily applied. • We analyze the time complexity trade-off between the user and the servers when using GASP codes, introduced in [3] and improved on in [4] . They are currently the best polynomial codes in terms of total communication cost. In particular, if the time complexity of an operation in F q is at most Z q and a matrix multiplication algorithm for n × n matrices with time complexity O(n ω Z q ) is used, then by optimizing this trade-off it is possible to make the total time of the system to be O(n 4− 6 ω+1 Z q ), as opposed to the O(n ω ) time it would take for the user to do the computation locally. arXiv:2001.05568v1 [cs.IT] 15 Jan 2020 (a) Trade-off between the user and servers' computation exponents, e.g. if the servers use the standard matrix multiplication algorithm, ω = 3, and the user sets its computational complexity exponent to 2.5 then the server will also have a computational complexity exponent of 2.5.
(b) Total time complexity for GASP when choosing best trade-off between user and servers' time complexity exponent as a function of the exponent of the matrix multiplication algorithm, ω. We show that ε can be chosen so that the total time complexity has exponent 4 − 6 ω+1 . Fig. 1 : The figures pertain to the setting in Section V where we analyze the computational complexity of GASP codes. In this setting, r = s = t = n, the security parameter T is a constant, the partitioning parameters K = L = n ε , and the servers use a matrix multiplication algorithm with computational complexity O(n ω ).
II. NOTATION
We use the following asymptotic notation. f (n) = Ω(g(n)).
We assume a base field F p over which all elementary operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) take constant time. We also assume that transmitting symbols in F p between the user and the servers takes constant time.
When constructing polynomial codes we will need to consider a field extension F q of F p . We assume that any elementary operation or generation of a random element in F q take time at most Z q . The possible values for Z q depend on the representation of the field elements, e.g. powers of a generator of the group of units F × q or polynomials in
irreducible and of degree d with p d = q), and of the underlying machine, e.g. a Turing machine or a Boolean circuit [8] , and its implementation [9] , [10] .
We set Z q = O(log(q) γ ), i.e. Z q is polylogarithmic. If only additions and multiplications are used, for example, we can set γ = 2 if we use standard polynomial multiplication. This can be reduced by using better multiplication algorithms. Next, we assume that the transmission of one q-ary symbol has communication cost at most C q . If we use the usual polynomial representation, then C q = O(log(q)).
We denote by M(r, s, t) the computation complexity of multiplying an r × s matrix by a s × t matrix. The study of the computational complexity of matrix multiplication is one of the main topics in algebraic complexity theory.
The most understood case is for square matrices, i.e. when r = s = t = n. In [11] , Strassen presented the first algorithm outperforming the standard O(n 3 ). Strassen's algorithm has computational complexity O(n log 2 (7) ) ≈ O(n 2.81 ). This was further improved to ≈ O(n 2.37 ) by Coppersmith, Winograd, and Le Gall [12] , [13] . Since any entry of both n × n matrices has to be used in general, the number of operations is at least Ω(n 2 ). It is an open conjecture, if there is an algorithm which uses Θ(n 2 ) operations.
III. PRIVATE ORACLE QUERYING
We begin this section by giving a simplified example of the private oracle querying scheme. It consists in transforming the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem into a private information retrieval problem [14] .
The reason for naming it Oracle Querying, is that the technique applies to settings more general than matrix multiplication. Indeed the same can be done even for non-computable functions, say if the servers have access to some oracle.
A. An Example
Let A, B ∈ F 2 and the number of servers be N = 2 none of which collude, thus T = 1, r = s = t = 1, and q = 2. The user is interested in AB ∈ F 2 .
The Private Oracle Querying scheme consists in transforming the problem into a private information retrieval problem.
The servers begin by precomputing all M = q s(r+t) = 4 possible multiplications, shown in Table I . Then, each server stores all possible multiplications in its database, i.e. the third column of Table I . . The Servers perform an inner product of the received query with their database and sends it back to the user. The user then retrieves the i-th entry in the database by subtracting the responses.
B. The Scheme
We now present the scheme, which we refer to as private oracle querying. Theorem 1. Let N be the number of servers, T the security parameter, A ∈ F r×s q and B ∈ F s×t q . Then, the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem for computing AB ∈ F r×t q can be solved by solving a private information retrieval problem where each server has M = q s(r+t) files, each one of length rt.
Proof. As a preprocessing step of the scheme, each server computes all M = q s(r+t) possible matrix multiplications and stores them in its database. Considering each result of each multiplication as a file, each server then has M files, each of size rt. Thus, the secure distributed matrix multiplication problem can be reinterpreted as a private information retrieval problem where each server has M files, each of size rt.
If the field q is large enough, the user can use a simple secret sharing scheme. Proof. This rate can be achieved by using the construction in Section III B of [15] . The large field size is needed to guarantee the existence of an MDS code.
The download capacity for private information retrieval is known [16] . However, as the number of files grows, this capacity converges to the rate in Corollary 1.
If one uses the download rate as the sole performance metric for the setting in [1] , these private information retrieval codes can outperform the polynomial codes in [1]- [5] . They, however, have two shortcomings.
First, the upload cost is exponential, since even a single query will have the size of the whole database, q s(r+t) .
Second, the time to generate a single query, O(q s(r+t) ), is much longer than the time for the user to calculate the matrix multiplication locally using the standard matrix multiplication algorithm, O(rstZ q ).
In other settings, where the user does not have access to both matrices and computational costs are not considered, like in [7] or [6] , private oracle querying can be readily applied.
IV. POLYNOMIAL CODES
Polynomial codes for secure distributed matrix multiplication were first introduced in [1] and later improved on in [2]- [5] . The best performing polynomial codes in terms of total communication cost are known as GASP codes, introduced in [3] and improved on in [4] .
In this section we will analyze both the communication and time complexity of GASP codes.
A. GASP Codes
Let A ∈ F r×s q and B ∈ F s×t q be partitioned as follows:
A user chooses T matrices R t over F q of the same size as the A k independently and uniformly at random, and T matrices S t of the same size as the B independently and uniformly at random. A polynomial code is a choice of α = (α 1 , . . . , α K+T ) ∈ N K+T and β = (β 1 , . . . , β L+T ) ∈ N L+T defining the polynomials
S t x β L+t and their product h(x) = f (x)g(x).
Given N servers, the user chooses evaluation points a 1 , . . . , a N ∈ F q r for some finite extension F q r of F q . They then send f (a n ) and g(a n ) to server n = 1, . . . , N , who computes the product f (a n )g(a n ) = h(a n ) and transmits it back to the user. The user then interpolates the polynomial h(x) given all of the evaluations h(a n ), and attempts to recover all products A k B from the coefficients of h(x).
GASP codes are a family of polynomial codes constructed via a combinatorial table called the degree table.
In Table III we show the upload and download time complexity for GASP codes. These values follow directly from the analysis done in Appendix B of [17] .
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B. The Computational Complexity of GASP codes
In this section we perform an analysis on the computational time complexity of GASP codes. The computations can be separated into three parts.
1) User Encoding: the computation time it takes the user to generate the evaluations that will be uploaded to the servers. 2) Server Computation: the computation time it will take each server to multiply the two evaluations it receives from the user. 3) User Decoding: the computation time it will take the user to decode the matrix multiplication from what it received from the servers. If using the standard matrix multiplication algorithm then we can substitute M r K , s, t L = O rst KL . V. CHOOSING THE RIGHT PARAMETERS In Section III we saw that one of the main drawbacks to the private oracle query are the computational costs. It would be quicker for the user to perform the matrix multiplication locally than to generate even a single query.
In this section we show that, by choosing the right parameters for GASP, secure distributed matrix multiplication can speed up the computation time when compared to the user performing the computation locally.
We will analyze the following setting. We consider square matrices, i.e. r = s = t = n, assume that the security parameter, T , is a constant, and that the partitioning parameter K = L = n ε for some 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. We also assume that the servers multiply two n × n matrices using an algorithm with computational complexity O(n ω ). Our goal is to study the time complexity of GASP codes as n grows.
In [4] , it was shown that for GASP codes we have the bounds KL ≤ N ≤ (K + T )(L + T ). Thus, N = Θ(K 2 ).
We calculate the time complexity for each of the servers.
Proposition 1. Let r = s = t = n, T be a constant, K = L, and O(n ω ) be the computational complexity of the algorithm which the servers use to multiply an n × n matrix. Then, the time complexity for each server to compute the matrix multiplication sent to it in the GASP scheme is O( n ω K ω−1 Z q ). Proof. The rectangular matrices each server has to multiply, say F and G, have dimensions n K × n and n × n K , so that they can be split into
so that F i and G i are square matrices with shape n K × n K and
The right hand side can be evaluated by K matrix multiplications requiring O(( n K ) ω ) (with 2 ≤ ω) field operations and (K − 1)( n K ) 2 additions of field elements. So the total time complexity is
Proposition 2. Assume the setting of Proposition 1 and that K = L = n ε . Then, the time complexity for each operation in GASP is given in Table V. Proof. The proof follows from substituting the values in the hypothesis and Proposition 1 into Theorem 2.
We will now deal with the field size. Indeed, to use GASP we need the field size to satisfy certain bounds. Thus, by making n grow, it will also be necessary to make the field size q to grow.
Proposition 3. Assume the setting in Proposition 2 and that Z q = Θ(log(q) γ ). Then Z q = Θ(log(n) γ ).
Proof. The proof for GASP codes in [17, Lemma 2] , shows an argument for the evaluation points of f and g to exist if q > 2 N T + 1 · J. Moreover, J = j∈J j where J is the set of exponents in h(x) = j∈J h j x j with #J = N . Since we apply GASP, all entries in the degree table are between zero and
In particular, a field size larger than 2 N T + 1 · W (W +1) 2 is sufficient. An application of the Stirling approximation n! ∼ √ 2πn(n/e) n yields
is a lower bound on the sufficient field size.
Using the same exemplary parameters as in Section V, i.e., T = constant, K = L = n ε , and N ∈ Θ(K 2 ), this simplifies to Θ(n 2ε(T +2) ). Using a field size in Θ(n 2ε(T +2) ) implies Z q ∈ Θ(log(n 2ε(T +2) ) γ ) = Θ(log(n) γ ).
We are now ready to calculate the total time complexity when implementing GASP codes. Theorem 3. Assume the setting in Proposition 2. Then, the total time complexity of GASP is O(n max{ε+ω−εω,2+2ε} Z q ) Proof. We begin by noting that since C q = O(log(q)), it follows that C q = O(Z q ).
Since all servers perform their computations in parallel, the total time complexity, T , is the sum of the time complexities in Table V , T = O((K 2 n 2 + K 2 n 2 + n ω K ω−1 )Z q + (Kn 2 + n 2 )C q ) = O(n max{ε+ω−εω,2+2ε} Z q ).
The parameter ε controls the trade-off between computational costs at the client (O(n 2+2ε Z q )) versus computational costs at each of the servers (O(n ε+ω−εω Z q )). This trade-off, shown in Figure 1a , is linear in the exponents. By choosing ε carefully we can bound the total time complexity, as shown in Figure 1b .
Corollary 2. Assume the setting in Proposition 2. The minimum total time complexity for GASP is O(n 4− 6 ω+1 Z q ) for ε = ω−2 ω+1 . Thus, by using GASP, the user can perform the matrix multiplication in time O(n 4− 6 ω+1 Z q ) as opposed to the O(n ω ) time it would take to do locally. Note here that since Z q = O(log(n) γ ), this is always an improvement.
We also note that if the user uses F q as the base field, i.e. for very large fields, then Z q can be taken to be constant.
